As the use of electronic voting systems and e-commerce systems increases, the efficient batch verification of digital signatures becomes more and more important. In this paper, we first propose a new method to identify bad signatures in batches efficiently for the case when the batch contains one bad signature. The method can find out the bad signature using smaller number of modular multiplications than the existing method. We also propose an extension to the proposed method to find out two or more bad signatures in a batch instance. Experimental results show that our method yields better performance than the existing method in terms of the number of modular multiplications. key words: batch verification, batch identification, RSA
Introduction
The expanding use of e-commerce has raised the need for digital signatures. For example, geographically distributed merchants and consumers should belong to a single realm of trust in web-based commerce. By employing digital signatures, they guarantee authentication, integrity, and nonrepudiation for each transaction.
To implement digital signatures, we need signing and verification algorithms. While the signing algorithm is executed once by the one holding a secret-key, the verification algorithm may be executed many times by anyone holding the corresponding public-key. A growing usage of digital signatures for electronic payment systems and electronic voting systems stresses the need for streamlining of the signature verification. Therefore, verification is a very important factor in the performance of a system that uses a digital signature. In such environment, verifying multiple digital signatures simultaneously instead of verifying each digital signature individually is an attractive approach.
Much work has been conducted to verify multiple signatures in batches [1] - [6] . Among them, Bellare et al. have suggested the generic test for fast verification of digital signatures in batches [1] . If a batch instance, or a collection of signatures, passes the generic test, it means that there are no bad signatures so that the verifier can accept all the signatures as valid. Otherwise, there are some invalid signatures in the batch instance. Some invalid signatures in a batch instance incur another problem of identifying which ones are bad in a batch instance. Several methods have been proposed to identify the bad signatures efficiently. One method referred to as divide-and-conquer verifier, is to take a contaminated batch, split it into subsets and apply the generic test to each subset repeatedly until all bad signatures are identified. Another method referred to as Hamming Code Verifier is to look for the location of a bad signature in a batch instance when there is only one bad signature. Hamming Code verifier is to create subsets according to a parity check matrix based Hamming Codes. Then it applies the generic test to each subset and finds out the position of the bad signature [7] .
In this paper, we propose a new method for identifying bad signatures efficiently in a batch instance. Our method can identify which signature is a bad one under the condition that there is only one bad signature in a batch instance. The method can tell where the bad signature is in a batch without applying divide-and-conquer approach. When there are multiple bad signatures in a batch, we adopt the divide-andconquer approach. But the number of divided sub-instances is much smaller than that of the existing method. Performance evaluation results show that our method reduces the number of generic tests invoked significantly, and outperforms conventional methods in terms of the number of modular multiplication operations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an introduction on the prior methods to identify bad signatures in batches. In Sect. 3, we propose a new method for identifying a bad signature efficiently. Section 4 compares our method with the previous method in the number of generic tests invoked and the number of modular multiplications. The paper concludes in Sect. 5.
Related Work
Digital signatures can be classified as either DSA-type signatures or RSA-type signatures [7] . In this paper, we consider only RSA-type signatures. In a RSA-type signature scheme with a message m and its signature s, the following equation must hold. 
In the equation, m i is a message and s i is m i 's signature. When all of the signatures s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s n in x are valid, Eq. (2) is satisfied [6] , [7] . However, even though it is rare, there is a possibility that two or more bad signatures in a batch instance affect mutually and make a side effect that Eq. (2) is satisfied. To decrease the possibility, Bellare et al. presented batch verification tests [1] . These batch verification tests, denominated as GT (Generic Test) in previous study [7] , make use of a probabilistic algorithm and is defined as follows:
, (m n , s n )) and security parameter l. The GT (x, n) takes x and i) returns "true" whenever all signatures are valid. The test never makes mistakes for this case. ii) returns "false" whenever there is at least one bad signature. In this case the test makes mistakes with probability 2 −l .
To implement GT , the Random Subset Test and the Small Exponents Test were proposed in the previous study [8] . The two batch verification tests are described in Fig. 1 . By applying GT , we can decide whether the batch instance contains bad signatures or not. Consider the case when GT fails (i.e. GT (x, n) = "false"). This means that there is at least one bad signature in a batch instance. However, GT does not provide any information about the number of the bad signatures and each location of them.
Therefore, the verifier is faced with another problem of identifying bad signatures. To handle this problem, identification of bad signatures can be performed by so called Divide-and-Conquer verifier (DCV α ) which is defined as follows: 
Definition 2 (DCV
is "true," return "true" and exit. Otherwise return x as a bad signature. ii) If n 1, then run GT (x, n). If GT (x, n) is "true," return "true" and exit. Otherwise go to the step iii).
If all signatures in a batch instance are valid, then DCV α returns "true." Otherwise, DCV α returns a sequence of signatures as bad signatures in a batch instance.
Proposed Method
We propose a new method for identifying bad signatures efficiently in a batch instance. Our method can not only detect the existence of bad signatures but also identify the position of bad signatures in a batch instance.
We first present a basic method that works for the case when only one bad signature exists in a batch instance. Next, we enhance the basic method using a divide-and-conquer approach that works for the case when multiple bad signatures exist. Our basic method, denominated as DBI basic (Division Based Identifier Basic), returns "true" when all signatures are valid. DBI basic returns an integer as the index of a bad signature when only a bad signature exists in a batch instance and it returns "false" when two or more bad signatures exist. DBI basic defined as follows:
DBI basic tries to i) Apply GT to the given batch instance. If GT (x, n) is "true," return "true" and exit. Otherwise, go to the next step.
iii) Find an integer k which satisfies the following equation
If an integer k exists, go to the next step. Otherwise, return "false" and exit. iv) Apply GT to the given instance without the k-th sig-
is "true," return k as the index of the bad signature. Otherwise, return "false" and exit.
The main parts of DBI basic are step ii) and iii), that is Eq. (3).
We will elaborate what Eq. (3) implies in Theorem 1. Note that step iv) in Definition 3 is carried out to confirm that k is actually the position of the bad signature. In fact, this step is not required when there is only one bad signature in a batch instance. This is required because the k could not be the index of a bad signature when there are two or more bad signatures. 
By substituting
in Eq. (3) respectively, we can derive the equation
This implies that k is equal to j, which is the index of the bad signature.
The DBI basic invokes GT only twice when there is one bad signature, while the previous method DCV α invokes GT α log α n + 1 times [7] . However, there is a trade-off that DBI basic needs some additional overheads to figure out an integer k from Eq. (3). These overheads is not incurred in DCV α . In the next section, we will discuss how these overheads are compared with the overhead of GT .
Suppose there are multiple bad signatures in a batch instance. To find the multiple bad signatures efficiently, we extend DBI basic to DBI α using divide-and-conquer approach. We define DBI α as follows: s n ) ) of length n. DBI α tries to i) In case n=1, run GT (x, 1). If GT (x, 1) is "true," return "true" and exit. Otherwise return x as a bad signature. ii) In case n=2 such that x = ((m 1 , s 1 ), (m 2 , s 2 ) ), run GT (x, 2).
ii-1) If GT (x, 2) is "true," return "true" and exit.
ii-2) Otherwise, compute (s 1 s iii) In case n > 2, run GT (x, n). If GT (x, n) is "true," return "true" and exit. Otherwise, go to the next step.
Find an integer k which satisfies Eq. (3) where 1 ≤ k ≤ n. If the integer k exist, go to the next step. Otherwise, go to the step vii). vi) Apply GT on the given instance without the k-th signature, (m n , s n ) ). If GT (x , n − 1) is "true," return k as the index of the bad signature and exit. Otherwise, go to the next step. vii) Divide x into α batch instances (
If there is no bad signature in a batch instance, then DBI α returns "true." Otherwise, DBI α returns a sequence of integers as indexes of bad signatures in a batch instance. Note that the steps from iii) to vi) are similar to the steps of the DBI basic . Also, The steps i) and vii) are adopted from the divide-and-conquer approach. Finally, note that the steps ii) is for the special case of DBI basic when n is 2. We consider the case separately since our method can identify bad signatures without the divide-and-conquer while the previous method DCV α can not.
Performance Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed method. First, we compute both the maximum number and the average number of GT s that is invoked in DBI α , and compare the results of DBI α with those of DCV α . In the previous method DCV α , the analytic results have been reported only when α is two (the method is referred to as DCV 2 ), and both the number of bad signatures and the size of batch instance are powers of two [7] .Note that the cost of GT depends on n and l which are the number of signatures and security parameter respectively. To compare DBI α and DCV α , we analyze the performance with the same conditions proposed by Pastuszak et al. [7] .
Then, we perform some simulations to compare DBI α and DCV α with various parameters. We show the simulation results for various values of the number of divided subinstances, the number of bad signatures and the size of batch instance. Finally, we compare the experimental results of two methods in terms of the number of modular multiplications.
Number of GT s Invoked : Analytic Results
We first consider the case when α is two, that is DCV 2 and DBI 2 . Let N max (n, t) be the maximum number of GT s invoked to identify all t bad signatures out of total n signatures. When there is one bad signature in a batch instance, DBI 2 can identify the bad signature by invoking GT twice, i.e. N max (n, 1) = 2.
When there are two bad signatures in a batch instance, the worst scenario is that the two bad signatures belong to the same sub-instance continuously until each sub-instance contains only two signatures. In the scenario, the division in the step vii) in Definition 4 is executed by ( log 2 n − 1) times and GT is invoked 2 times at each division (one for the left sub-instance and the other for the right sub-instance). Then GT is invoked once additionally at the outset. So, we obtain that in the worst scenario the maximum number of GT s invoked by DBI 2 is N max (n, 2) = 2 log 2 n −1. Note that the number of GT s invoked by DCV 2 in the worst scenario for DBI 2 is 2 log 2 n + 1.
If there are more than two bad signatures in a batch instance, the estimation of N max (n, t) can be carried out as follows. We assume t is powers of two, that is t = 2 r , likely as [7] . In the DBI 2 , the worst case occurs when all subinstances contain precisely two bad signatures after the (r − 1)-th recursive step. In the case, DBI 2 should invoke GT s (2 r−1 − 1) times. So, we obtain that
We can identify two bad signatures in each sub-instance of size n 2 r−1 by calling GT 2( log 2 n − r) + 1 times. Therefore, we obtain that
The worst scenario of DCV 2 is that all sub-instances contain precisely one bad signature, which differs from that of DBI 2 .
The maximum number of GT s invoked by DCV 2 under the worst scenario is 2 r+1 ( log 2 n − r + 1) − 1 [7] . Now, we compute the average number of GT s invoked in DBI 2 by applying the same approach used in [7] . We denote by N avg (t, n) the average number of GT s invoked to identify t bad signatures out of total n signatures. As the DBI 2 is probabilistic in its nature, the number N avg (t, n) is in fact a random variable. So we derive the probability distribution for the variable N avg (t, n) to estimate the average number.
Assume n = 2 q which is the same condition as [7] . When t = 1, the DBI 2 calls GT twice, i.e. N avg (1, n) = 2. When t = 2, the random variable N avg (2, n) can be expressed by variables N avg (2, 
2 ) with p 1,0 2 + N avg (2, n 2 ) with p 2,0 where p 1,0 is the probability that the initial batch instance is split into two sub-instances containing one bad signature each and p 2,0 is the probability that two bad signatures are contained within the same sub-instance.
The above term, N avg (2, n 2 ), can be expressed as follows: 
with p 2,i where i = 2, . . . , q − 1. Assume that, at the j-th phase, two bad signatures clustered together in a single instance have been split into two different sub-instances. This means that the bad signatures are placed in the same instance j times in a row. Therefore, we can reduce the above equation as
where j = 0, 1, . . . , q − 1.
Now we calculate the probability p 1,i and p 2,i . The p 1,i is the probability that we choose a sub-instance of n 2 i+1 − 1 valid signatures and one bad signature from the batch instance of n 2 i signatures ( n 2 i − 2 valid signatures and 2 bad signatures). The probability can be calculated by using the hypergeometric distribution [9] . So, the probability p 1,i and p 2,i can be written as follows:
where i = 0, 1, . . . , q − 1. Therefore, the probability that two bad signatures are splitting into different sub-instance at the j-th phase is
we have the probability distribution of N avg (2, n) as follows:
for j = 0, 1, . . . , q − 1 and n = 2 q . Note that the probability distribution of N avg (2, n) in DCV 2 is as follows [7] :
for j = 0, 1, . . . , q − 1 and n = 2 q . The above equations are probability distributions for the number of GT s invoked to identify bad signature(s) when t = 2. Since we know the probability distribution, we can find out the average number of GT s by multiplying the expected value and its probability. We can derive the probability distributions for N avg (t, n) when t ≥ 3 and analytically compute the average number of GT s when t = 3, 4, . . . , n in the similar manner. However, we will not present the detailed analysis. Instead we show the estimated value of the average number of GT s invoked using a computer simulation. The simulation results are shown in the next section. 
Number of GT s Invoked : Simulation Results
We built a simulator for the DBI 2 and the DCV 2 . Then, based on a synthetic workload which contains t bad signatures out of n signatures, we have measured the average number of GT s invoked in each method. Our simulation results of DCV 2 are identical to those of DCV 2 reported in [7] .
The results are shown in Fig. 2 . In the figure, X-axis is the number of bad signatures and Y-axis is the average number of GT s invoked, while n is the total number of signatures considered. The values reported here are the average of 10000-th trials.
From the results, we can find out that the DBI 2 method shows better performance than the DCV 2 method. As n and t increase, the performance gap also increases. This implies that the proposed DBI 2 is more efficient with the large number of signatures in batches.
We have also evaluated the performance of DBI α and DCV α when α ≥ 2. The simulation results are shown in Fig. 3 where n is fixed to 4096 while t and α are ranged from 1 to 32 and from 2 to 16 respectively. The results show that DBI α performs better than DCV α for all cases of α considered. Also, we can see that DBI 2 and DBI 4 show similar performance each other, while DBI 8 and DBI 16 show worse performance than the formers. The results imply that the larger α increases the number of sub-instances, which makes more invocations of GT s. These results are observed in DCV α too.
Number of Modular Multiplications
There are two performance implications in the proposed DBI 2 . In Fig. 2 , the DBI 2 reduces significantly the number of GT s compared with the DCV 2 . However, another factor has to be considered to evaluate the overall performance. That is, the DBI 2 causes some additional overhead to solve Eq. (3) which is not incurred in the previous DCV 2 . Consequently, to compare the DBI 2 with the DCV 2 thoroughly, it is necessary to measure the performance of each method in terms of the number of modular multiplications. To do so, we convert the additional overhead into the number of modular multiplications. The additional overhead of DBI 2 is incurred in the step iv) and v) of Definition 4.
In the step iv) of Definition 4, we can get This problem is a kind of the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) [10] , [11] . It is generally known that there is no polynomial time algorithm to solve the DLP. However, the proposed DBI 2 is in a restricted domain of DLP, that is, k lies in the certain interval of integer, say [1,n] . Some efficient algorithms have been proposed for this case. To solve DBI 2 efficiently, we employ Shanks' baby-step giant-step algorithm [12] which can compute k in at most 2 √ n modular multiplications (3 √ n/2 on the average case) [11] . As a result, DBI 2 requires one modular exponentiation and 2n+3 √ n/2 modular multiplications additionally. Next, we convert the computational cost of GT into the number of modular multiplications under two different assumptions. In first assumption, the random subset test [8] is used as GT . GT requires l modular exponentiations and 2 × l × (c − 1) modular multiplications where l is a security parameter and c is the order of S in Fig. 1 . c is n/2 in average case where n is the size of a batch instance. In the second assumption, the small exponents test [8] is used as GT . We can compute m = i∈S m i h i and s = i∈S s i h i with l + nl/2 modular multiplication respectively in Fig. 1 . So, the computational cost of GT is one modular exponen-tiation and 2l + nl modular multiplications when the small exponents test is used as GT . Note that l is commonly set to 60 [8] , [13] . Finally, we convert the computational cost of a modular exponentiation as the number of modular multiplications to compare performance results precisely. We suppose that a modular exponentiation is implemented as the sliding-window algorithm [14] . One modular exponentiation in RSA can be computed by 17 modular multiplications where key length is 1024 bits and public key value is 65537 [15] , [16] . Figure 4 shows the performance comparison between DBI 2 and DCV 2 in terms of the number of modular multiplications when the random subset test is used as GT . In the figure, X-axis is the number of bad signatures and Y-axis is the average number of modular multiplications. From the results, we can observe that the DBI 2 method reduces considerably the average number of modular multiplications compared with DCV 2 when the bad signatures in a batch are identified. That is, DBI 2 reduces the number of modular Fig. 4 The average number of modular multiplications in DBI 2 and DCV 2 when the random subset test is used as GT .
Fig. 5
The average number of modular multiplications in DBI 2 and DCV 2 when the small exponents test is used as GT . multiplications by 21-30% when n is 1024. This means that our method can improve the overall performance even considering the additional overhead which is incurred in Eq. (3). Figure 5 shows the performance comparison between DBI 2 and DCV 2 in terms of the number of modular multiplications when the small exponents test is used as GT . From the results, we can observe that DBI 2 reduces the number of modular multiplications by 11-33% compared with DCV 2 when n is 1024. We also find out that the random subset test shows better performance than the small exponents test when bad signatures exist in a batch instance and n gets larger. On the contrary, the small exponents test surpasses the random subset test when there is no bad signature in a batch instance [8] .
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a new batch identification method, DBI α that could identify bad signatures in a batch instance. When there is only one bad signature, DBI α can identify it with one modular exponentiation and 2n + 3 √ n/2 modular multiplications where n is the size of a batch instance. When there are multiple bad signatures in a batch, DBI α adopt the divide-and-conquer approach. However, the number of divided sub-instances in the approach is much smaller than that of DCV α . Experimental results have shown that the proposed method outperforms the previous method in terms of both the number of GT s invoked and the number of modular multiplications.
